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Abstract 
 
Globally installed wind power capacity has grown tremendously since 2000. This study focuses 
on the local economic impacts of wind power deployment. A theoretical model shows that wind 
power deployment is not necessarily driven by locally-accruing economic payoffs, but also by 
other factors such as emphasis on environmentally-friendly energy production and its 
associated benefits. The theoretical analysis is followed by an empirical analysis using German 
county-level panel data. After controlling for a set of observable and unobservable factors, the 
results state that wind power installation has no impact on GDP per capita. These findings 
support the predictions from the theoretical model: local economic impacts cannot alone explain 
the observed increase in wind power capacity.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Global wind power deployment has surged since 2000. At that point only 18 gigawatts (GW) 
of capacity were installed worldwide. By the end of 2014, this has soared to about 370 GW 
(Global Wind Energy Council, 2015). China, the United States and Germany are at the forefront 
of this development, with Germany leading in the early 2000s, while China and the US have 
subsequently taken the lead. Many other countries, e.g. India, Canada, and Spain, have, to 
various degrees, also increased their annually installed capacity since 2005. This worldwide 
growth of wind capacity fosters energy independence (Yue et al., 2001) and usually costs less 
than other renewable energies like solar power (International Energy Agency, 2012). Further, 
wind energy production has the advantage of usually being spatially decentralized and, thus, it 
has the potential to encourage economic development to a variety of local regions. 
Consequently, many industrialized and emerging countries are actively supporting renewable 
energies through legislative and policy initiatives (among them China, the US, the EU countries 
and many developing countries, see, for instance, Ren21, 2014).  
However, the actual economic consequences for the counties where wind power 
capacity is installed are not clear. National- and state-wide economic outcomes have received 
considerably more attention. At the local level, the potential positive factors include increased 
incomes/revenues for those employees and companies employed either during the construction 
period or once the facility is operational. Lease payments to landowners, for externally-owned 
installations, and earnings/losses for locally-owned installations, are positive factors. On the 
other hand, wind power development has the potential to negatively impact other aspects, 
including tourism, the desire of people to live in a certain region, demand for land, as well as 
the availability of employees for other projects. Furthermore, as a consequence of a growing 
wind industry, regular thermal power plants could receive less investment and employ fewer, 
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thus being crowded out. Whether or not wind farms are implemented depends largely on the 
inherent perception that both local authorities and the population have of the local economic 
impacts (Mulvaney et al., 2013; Toke, 2005).1 In addition, several factors might affect the 
economic consequences of the establishment of wind power plants, such as a region’s economic 
prosperity and its degree of urbanization and industrialization. For instance, one could argue 
that the greater its capability of participating in the construction site and maintenance work, the 
more a region benefits from wind power installations. 
Not surprisingly do the estimates of the local economic effects of wind power 
instalments vary a lot. Brown et al. (2012) conduct an empirical analysis of local economic 
effects in wind-rich regions in the US. In their quasi-cross-sectional approach, they find that 
per capita labor income at the county-level is increased by 11,500 USD/MW. Other studies 
scrutinize the local economic effects using ex-ante model analyses like Input-Output and 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. For instance, Slatterya et al. (2011) conclude 
that the gains for the respective counties lie at 2,600 USD/MW in Texas. Focusing on a region 
in Oklahoma, Greene and Geisken (2013) find an increase in local gains by 9,730 USD/MW. 
Bristow et al. (2012) conclude that in Wales, the economic incentives from the installations are 
rather marginal, so that Welsh counties have little interest in proceeding with wind power 
projects. Furthermore, potential investors often pay “community benefits” in order to gain local 
acceptance. Similarly, Munday et al. (2011) find only small economic benefits for the involved 
counties in Wales. Furthermore, they state that such community benefits also exist in other parts 
of the UK. In their analysis, Allan et al. (2011) furthermore find that forms of community 
benefits outweigh the importance of local sourcing. Schröder (2010) dissects the economic 
impacts of hypothetical wind turbine deployment in Hannover, Germany. He concludes that 
                                                 
1  Hitaj (2013) finds that federal production tax credit, state-level sales tax credit and production 
incentives, together with access to the electricity transmission grid play important roles in promoting 
wind power development in the United States. 
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“the construction and the operation of wind power systems in the region Hannover do not have 
any significant meaning for the region’s economy” (p.75).  
In this study the effect of wind power capacity on the economic development at the local 
level is operationalized by using information at the county level (“Landkreise” and “Kreisfreie 
Städte”) in Germany. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is used as the dependent 
variable, an often-utilized indicator of general economic welfare (Barro, 1991). The channels 
through which communities can benefit or lose from wind projects are likely to be captured 
through this measure. If investments, spending or revenues are affected in any areas of the local 
economy, this will be reflected in an increase or decrease of GDP per capita. Using German 
data for the purpose of the analysis has several advantages. Germany has been a forerunner 
when it comes to governmental support of renewable energies through the use of feed-in tariffs 
(Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). In addition to national support schemes, local legislation plays an 
important role for the installation of wind turbines. In Germany, regional decision bodies 
designate appropriate areas through zoning (land development plans: “Flächennutzungspläne”) 
and conduct the approval processes (Schröder, 2010). Over the 2002-09 sample period, IWES 
(2012) numbers show that the installed wind capacity increased from 11,860 to more than 
25,000 Megawatts. In 2013, it represented about 7.9% of the gross electricity production, 
making it the leading renewable electricity source, ahead of biomass (6.8%), photovoltaic 
(4.5%), hydro power (3.4%) and residual waste (0.8%) (Statista, 2014). Furthermore, according 
to the “Energy concept” and the German Energiewende, at least 80% of gross electricity 
consumption should be met by renewable sources by 2050 (BMU, 2011). Thus, wind energy 
deployment is of major importance for the German electricity market and its economy.  
This study contributes to the literature by assessing the local economic impacts of wind 
power deployment using panel-type of data. Except Brown et al. (2012), who use a quasi-cross-
sectional approach, most existing studies analyze single wind power deployment projects 
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instead of conducting analyzes on average outcomes. Through the use of panel data, the 
potential endogeneity and selection issues – if the installation of wind power is affected by 
effects of unobserved, individual factors in the counties – can be addressed.2 This approach 
allows for feedback processes between GDP per capita growth and the installation of wind 
power. To the authors’ best knowledge, this is also the first empirical analysis of the local 
economic effects of wind power deployment for Germany.  
 The initial pooled OLS results show that installed wind power capacity has a statistically 
significant positive impact on GDP per capita. This positive effect disappears once unobserved 
background characteristics are controlled for by using panel data estimation methods. These 
panel methods can be seen as ways to control for unobserved selection effects on unobservables. 
Such selection could occur if turbines are installed in counties depending on the quality of the 
infrastructure, the political environment, the efficiency and structure of its administration, and 
cultural differences. Several robustness checks, including panel IV estimation techniques, a 
dynamic specification, and testing for cross-sectional dependency (neighbourhood effects), 
support the lack of a statistical significant effect of wind power installations.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 includes a short 
conceptual framework for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data used and the 
econometric approach. Section 4 presents the results from the estimation. Finally, in Section 5 
some concluding remarks are made. 
  
                                                 
2 It could be argued, as for instance Brown et al. (2012) do, that empirical assessment have the advantage 
over model-based simulations that they yield ex-post actual outcome-based insights, rather than ex-ante 
model simulations. These latter approaches include for instance econometric input-output (see for 
instance Rey 2000) and the CGE approach (see for instance Turner et al. 2012). Note however that these 
last estimation approaches scrutinize only particular, individual outcomes, whereas empirical ex-post 
analyses can do so for average, nation-wide outcomes. 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
 
A simplifying, yet not too unrealistic, assumption is that the counties are the actual land owners, 
as these local authorities do indeed shape the industry composition and land usage to a large 
extent through zoning decisions and policies. The utility function of a county is  
u(y, R, e∙W)          (1) 
where y denotes the income, which is equal to the expenditures, R the zones used for recreation 
(or non-income generating activities), and W the zones assigned to wind parks. It is furthermore 
assumed that the county prefers more of each of y, R, and W, i.e. uy > 0, uR > 0, and uw > 0.3 
The separate inclusion of W in the utility function is meant to capture that factors associated 
with wind power other than just local economic outcomes might also affect the zoning decisions. 
Such factors can exist for a multitude of reasons; a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and 
therefore less carbon-intensive electricity production, less dependency on fossil fuel imports, 
an active industry policy opting for wind power that can lead to a comparative advantage for 
German industries, and potentially enabling increased exports and therefore long-term 
employment effects.4 The e is a shift parameter such that a larger e induces more weight of W 
in the utility function.  
The county faces the following two constraints 
y = r∙W + v∙O + V         (2a) 
T = R + W + O         (2b) 
where r is rent for wind usage, W denotes the area used for wind power production, v is the rent 
from income-generating activities (other than wind usage), O areas used for other income 
                                                 
3 In addition, diminishing marginal utilities are assumed, i.e. .e. uyy < 0, uRR < 0, and uww < 0. 
4 These latter effects are admittedly most relevant at a national level, and only to a smaller degree at the 
local level. But due to the political processes, they are also likely to play a role at the local level. 
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generating activities, V transfers to the county unrelated to the use of the area, and T the total 
amount of land available. Now the budget constraint can be re-written as 
  y = (r-v)∙W + v∙(T-R) + V        (3) 
This static model can be formulated as a Lagrange function5 
 L = u(y, R, e∙W) - ∙(y - (r-v)∙W – v∙(T-R) –V)     (4) 
The first order conditions (FOC) are 
 dL/dy = uy -  = 0         (5a) 
 dL/dR = uR  - ∙v = 0         (5b) 
dL/dW = e∙uw + ∙(r-v) = 0        (5c) 
Holding equations (5a) and (5c) together results in the following expression6 
e∙uw / uy = v - r         (6) 
Eq. (6) shows that the loss of utility because a county wants wind power instead of income, i.e. 
the cost of valuing other factors than just local economic outcomes associated with wind parks, 
should equal the difference in income from O and W. This states that the disutility of forgone 
income from O should equal the utility from the other factors associated with wind power. 
Furthermore, this eq. equation shows that if the shift parameter e increases, i.e. that wind power 
becomes more important in the utility function, this has the same effect as an increase in the 
difference in the rental prices of the two income-generating alternatives of land usage. Given 
that uw > 0 and uww < 0, one would then see increased W. Therefore, factors other than just local 
                                                 
5 It is also worth pointing out that if politicians do not value any other factors of wind power, i.e. if 
zoning decisions were driven only by local pecuniary considerations, this could be modelled as u(y, 
W+O). Then one would only observe R + W, or R + O, and not R + W + O. This is not what is likely to 
be found; several municipalities have both W and O (in addition to R). Thus, this indicates that the utility 
function should be written as u(y, R, e∙W). 
6 The equations (5a) and (5b) can be rewritten as 
 v =  uR / uy  
which states that in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between R and y equals the opportunity 
costs of using the land only for recreation. Said differently, the disutility of giving up one unit of 
recreation area R is equal to the utility-gain of higher expenditures times the opportunity costs per unit 
v. 
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economic considerations affect zoning decisions; even in case of constant pecuniary transfers r 
for a wind project. Furthermore, increased demand for wind park areas, perhaps triggered by 
increased subsidies/transfers to wind park owners, would drive up the rental price of land, r. 
For the equality in eq. (6) to hold, this would mean a decrease in uw. This, along with uww < 0 
again, would yield an increase in W.  
Thus, the framework shows that both pure local financial considerations and other factors 
can be drivers of wind power development at the regional level. Naturally, the relative weight 
on financial and other factors is likely to be very different across regions (countries, counties) 
due to unique political landscapes and constituencies. Previous research on US counties, for 
example, finds that the economic factors could very well play an important role in the 
development of wind power projects, as they do materialize (Brown et al., 2012). In case of the 
UK, however, this does not appear to be the whole story. Community benefits are often 
additionally paid to the involved communities in the form of increased pecuniary transfers, r 
(Munday et al., 2011). For Germany, the substantial increase in land allocated to wind power 
could be driven by such local financial incentives or, possibly, other factors linked to wind 
power. 
 
3. Data Description and Econometric Strategy 
3.1 Data 
The panel data set is based on annual data for the 2002 to 2009 period for German counties. 
2002 was selected as the starting point for several reasons: First, the German feed-in-tariff 
underwent a major reform in 2001 (e.g. Butler and Neuhoff, 2008), such that the potential 
impacts of wind power installations may have been significantly affected, as they are possibly 
dependent on the order of magnitude and regulations of the feed-in tariff. Furthermore, due to 
the large technological changes since then, wind turbines from before 2002 are officially 
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considered to be technologically outdated and are available for special repowering feed-in 
tariffs (German Bundestag, 2011). The analysis goes until 2009 as it is the most recent year for 
which (almost) all data was available. In 2010, county-assignments in several German states 
were changed, and it became impossible to obtain the data for the old county definitions. 
 There are currently 402 counties (counting both Landkreise and kreisfreie Städte) in 
Germany (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung BBSR, 2013a). Some changes 
took place during the period under study. The State of Sachsen changed its county-assignment 
in 2008 (Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Umwelt und Landwirtschaft SMUL, 2008). As all 
the newer counties in Sachsen are exclusively combinations of “whole” old counties, the 
respective values for the new counties can be calculated by taking the (arithmetic) means or 
sums of the relevant variables for the old counties by weighing the influence of these old 
counties according to their population size. As no unemployment rates were available for 2008, 
the average of the unemployment rates of 2007 and 2009 of the respective new counties is taken. 
Sachsen-Anhalt changed its counties in 2007 (Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen-Anhalt, 2008). 
For neither the old, nor the new counties, is all the necessary data available for the present 
analysis. Thus all Sachsen-Anhalt counties are omitted from the analysis. Hannover, Aachen 
and Saarbrücken are left out of the analysis since they have a specific status (Regionalverband 
besonderer Art). The main argument for exclusion is that the various databases from which the 
data is collected switch between different assignments of these counties/regions. Observations 
for Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen (the latter one consisting of two counties) are also dropped. 
These are counties and states at the same time and, thus, their legal status and administrative 
structure are vastly different from all other counties. Given these modifications, the analysis 
comprises of observations for 393 counties from 12 different states. Therefore, there is a total 
of 3144 observations in the balanced panel dataset used for the empirical analyses. 
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 Most of the economic and socio-demographic data are collected from the 
“Regionaldatenbank Deutschland” (2013) database. The dependent variable is the GDP per 
capita in a county [in Euros], as this is a general measure of the level of economic development 
in a county, i.e. the level of total economic output relative the size of the population. It should 
capture the channels (investments/income and revenue) through which the installation of wind 
power capacity potentially influences a county’s economic development.7  
The installed amount of wind capacity is one explanatory variable and the one whose 
coefficient is the focus of this analysis. The information on the installed wind power capacity 
is obtained from the Ingenieurwerkstatt Energietechnik IWET (IWET, 2013). As data exists at 
the postal code level, these postal codes are mapped to the German counties.8 As this data 
contains the pre-2008 county-borders, the values for the counties in Sachsen were updated. In 
the next step, the data is aggregated by year and county. As Figure 1 shows, the wind turbines 
are not distributed equally across the country, but are concentrated in northern Germany. In 
particular, the coast in the north-west has a high density of windmills. Of the 30.8 gigawatts 
(GW) of wind power installed at the beginning of 2013, more than half (16.9 GW) was 
constructed between 2002 and 2009 (IWET, 2013). 
 
[Figure 1 “Installed onshore wind capacity in Germany” about here] 
  
Various socio-demographic, economic (and legal) factors may play a role in 
determining economic development. In addition to population size in a region, the demographic 
composition of the population, measured by the share of the elderly, is controlled for. Moreover, 
                                                 
7 Other measures of economic well-being, for instance wages, may be used. Wages would of course 
induce selection problems due to unemployment, and ignore capital income. GDP per capita, on the 
other hand, is a well-known and standard measure of economic development in spite of obvious 
shortcomings.  
8  See, for instance, Database-Marketing: Postleitzahlen zum Download, http://www.manfrin-
it.com/postleitzahlen/plz.html. 
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the share of foreigners can have an impact (Rupasingha et al., 2002). A population’s human 
capital also plays a role, as reflected in the share of the population with certain levels of 
education (Deller et al., 2001). This is captured by including three dummies based on the shares 
of the population with various educational attainments.9 The industry structure of the economy, 
as expressed by the share of the workforce working in the agricultural and in the manufacturing 
sector, and the respective share of males and females who are employed full time matters are 
also controlled for. As the counties’ current job-situation may also influence regional economic 
growth, unemployment rates are included as control variable. Furthermore, the degree of 
urbanization and, thus, the composition of the economy possibly lead to different economic 
growth rates (Bertinelli and Black, 2004). This point is operationalized by including four county 
category-dummies based on the definitions reported in Figure A1 in the appendix. This figure 
shows the structure of the German counties in 2010 (no categorization prior to this was 
available).10 From the figure it is notable that the share of urban counties is higher in the 
Western part of Germany than in the East.  
 
[Table 1 “Descriptive statistics” about here] 
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables over the 2002-2009 period. Note 
that the installed wind capacity is the accumulatively11 installed wind capacity, since 2002, per 
county. The table reveals that for both installed wind capacity and the wind potential, the 
standard deviation is very high compared to the respective mean values. This mirrors what is 
shown in Figure 1, namely that the installed wind capacity is distributed unequally across 
                                                 
9 For about 13% of the population, no information concerning their educational attainment was available. 
This group is assumed to come proportionally from the three included education groups.  
10 The county categories are included as time-independent dummies.  
11 Thus, this is the sum of all installed wind power capacity since 2002. The later-on introduced state- 
or county dummies may capture the pre-2002 installed wind capacity.  
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Germany, and the same is true for the wind instrument, which is discussed in the next section. 
The standard deviation of the GDP per capita is about 40% of its mean value, indicating that a 
certain degree of equality, with some variation between the German counties, exists. 
In addition the relative growth in GDP per capita from 2002 to 2009 is investigated, 
splitting the sample based on whether the counties (i) already had wind power instalments 
before 2002; (ii) counties that got wind power instalments for the first time during the sample 
period; and (iii) those counties that neither had any wind power instalments in the beginning of 
nor at the end of the sample period (the share of counties in the respective groups are; 65.4%, 
7.6%, and 27.0%).12 GDP growth is largest in the first group, while the smallest growth is found 
in the last group.13 It is an open question, though, whether the differences are caused by wind 
power instalments, or whether the differences are driven by confounding factors.  
 
3.2 Econometric Specification 
To identify the effect of the wind power deployment on the economic development in a county 
the following model is estimated 
 
0 1ln ' 'it it it it t itGDPcap InstWind SocioEcControl EconUrban v                (7) 
 
where the subscripts i denotes county, and t denotes year. ln GDPcap is the log-transformed 
GDP per capita, InstWind is the installed wind capacity. The SocioEcControl is a vector 
containing socio-economic- and demographic variables; population size, elderly share, 
foreigner share, and little and some education share.14 The EconUrban is a vector with variables 
                                                 
12 Detailed numbers for the three sub-groups of counties are available from the authors on request. 
13 The difference in the mean value of economic growth is statistically significant comparing the first 
and last groups, while the two other differences are not. 
14 The share of the population with a high education share serves as baseline. 
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describing the industry structure and the labour market, as well as the urbanization; agricultural 
employment share, manufacturing share, unemployment rate and the share of the male (female) 
labour force working full time. Time dummies ߬௧ are also included to control for macro shocks’ 
effects. The residual vit might include unobservable county specific components, such as 
political differences, preferences, regulations that all may vary between the counties.15  
The regressor of greatest interest to this study is the InstWind. Given the functional form 
of the dependent variable and the InstWind variable, the coefficient in front of the latter variable, 
ߚଵ, reflects how large the percentage change in GDP per capita is when the InstWind capacity 
is increased by one unit [here: gigawatt].  
As a number of laws and regulations concerning wind power and environmental policies 
are passed at the state level in Germany, economic growth across German states may differ. 
Thus, to allow for potential state specific effects, 11 state dummies are included.  
The model described by equation (7) is first estimated with a pooled OLS estimator. 
This assumes that each observation is independent from the others. Yet, wind power capacity 
investments may partly be motivated by regional development policies. The question of 
whether or not wind farms are implemented highly depends on the perception that both local 
authorities and the population have of the local economic impacts (Mulvaney et al., 2013; Toke, 
2005). In the existing dataset, there is no consistent information available for this.16 If it does 
play a role, though, the pooled OLS estimates will be biased. To account for these unobserved 
                                                 
15 Some of these components might be observable, for instance political preferences and regulations. 
However, for this study we do not have such information, and these effects will therefore be picked up 
by the county specific effects in the error term. 
16 In their analysis of wind farm development projects on the Shetland Islands, Allan et al. (2011) find 
that the ownership structures have great influences on local economic impacts. For Germany, reliable 
numbers about the share of wind projects where local residents are at least partial owners are highly 
uncertain (see for instance the discussion in Szarka and Blühdorn, 2006). Numbers limited to 
cooperatives show that these have only had economic significance since 2009, as less than 20 of these 
existed in the whole of Germany before 2009 (German Wind Energy Association, 2012). Deutsche 
WindGuard (2015), on the other hand, argues that local ownership played a major role already before 
2009. 
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county-specific factors and potential dependency over time for each county, the residual vit is 
decomposed into a county-specific term, ௜݂, and an idiosyncratic error term, ݑ௜௧. The resulting 
equation is estimated with both a random effects and a fixed effects estimator. The former 
assumes that the explanatory variables are independent of the unobserved county specific 
effects. The fixed effects model also drops this assumption, but is generally less efficient than 
the random effects model. Hence, after running the pooled OLS, random effects and fixed 
effects regressions, a Hausman specification test is conducted. It validates whether the 
explanatory variables are indeed independent of the unobserved county specific effects. If so, 
the random effects models’ estimates are to be preferred over the fixed effects’ ones.  
 
Instrumental variable 
In case of a feedback process of the economic growth onto the installation of wind power 
capacity, the estimation results will be biased. This endogeneity bias can be dealt with by using 
an instrumental variable approach. A county’s wind potential is a possible instrument for the 
installed wind capacity. The critical assumption for the chosen instrumental variable, potential 
wind capacity, is that it should only affect the indicator of economic welfare through changes 
in installed wind capacity, without a direct effect. It seems unlikely that the weather condition 
or wind should have a direct effect on the GDP per capita.17 Thus the exclusion restriction 
seems to be fulfilled. The discussion is supplemented with an endogeneity test; the difference 
of two Sargan-Hansen tests is taken, where one treats the regressor as endogenous and one 
treats them as exogenous. A significant difference indicates exogeneity of the instrument. The 
Kleibergen-Paap test, a robust variant of the Stock and Yogo (2005), is used to check the 
validity of the instruments (see Baum et al., 2007). This is complimented by a simple F-test of 
                                                 
17 Wind conditions might have affected a country’s industry composition for historical reasons; in the 
regressions there are controls for industry composition and urbanisation. 
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the instruments in the first stage regression in two stage least squares (2SLS), see Staiger and 
Stock (1997). 
The wind potential is based on a county’s particular natural attributes, including its wind 
strength, unevenness of ground, elevation and geographic location. 18  For every square 
kilometre, the wind generation potential over a five-year period for a specific turbine is 
measured (source: DWD 2013). Next, the calculated wind potentials are set in relation to the 
electricity a turbine would generate in “standard” conditions, as described in the German feed-
in tariff (German Bundestag, 2011).19 Since only areas where the wind return is above 60% of 
this standard value are eligible for the German feed-in tariff (and are thus interesting for 
investors), areas are ignored where the expected wind return is below this 60% threshold.20 
Finally, the wind potential for every square kilometre spot in a county is summed up.21  
 
[Figure 2 “Wind Energy Potential in Germany” about here] 
 
Wind energy potential in mainland Germany is shown in Figure 2. In the black areas, 
the expected wind return is below the aforementioned 60%-threshold. The white areas are 
regions where wind power deployment is more likely due to excellent wind conditions (more 
than 100% of the standard scenario). In line with their actually installed wind capacity, the 
northern German coastal areas have a high wind potential, while many parts of southern 
Germany fall below the 60% of the reference value. Examining Figure 1 and Figure 2 together, 
                                                 
18 Note that it is not only the average wind speed at a location, but also the distribution of the wind 
speeds that matters for whether or not a location is a suitable for wind power deployment (DWD, 2013). 
19 The feed-in tariff provides investors with financial incentives to deploy wind power, as they are paid 
a certain amount of money for all electricity produced, which is dependent on wind strength. This 
amount depends on the suitability of the area where the wind turbines stand, operationalized through the 
introduction of a “standard” location, to which the actually produced amount of electricity is compared.  
20 In the version of the support scheme that applied in the sample period. 
21 In the quite frequent cases where one square kilometre spot reaches into two (or more) counties, it is 
assigned to the county with which it has the largest overlap. 
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it can be seen that, as hypothesized for the construction of the instrumental variable, wind 
potential and actual wind capacity installations often go together. Furthermore, it is noteworthy 
that also areas that do not have the highest wind potential can have large amounts of installed 
wind capacity, e.g. in middle and eastern Germany.  
One last modification is done with the potential instrument. For each year in the sample 
period, the annual share of the total amount of new wind installations over the whole sample 
period is calculated at the national level giving an annual (but cross-sectionally invariant) share 
variable. This share might serve as proxy for the general interest or attitude regarding green 
energy in Germany. This share in itself is unlikely to be correlated with the county specific 
annual economic development. Finally, the product of the annual installed wind capacity share 
and the county-specific time-invariant wind potential is taken. Thus, we end up with a time-
varying county-specific instrument that is correlated with the annual county specific wind 
installations, but (most likely) uncorrelated with the annual county-specific GDP per capita 
measure.   
 
4. Empirical results 
 
The results of the pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed effects are displayed in Table 2.22  
 
 [Table 2 “Empirical results” about here] 
 
Starting with the pooled OLS results reported in column (1), it can be seen that installed wind 
power capacity has a statistically significant effect with an increase of 1 GW installed wind 
power resulting in an increase of 0.389% in GDP per capita.  
                                                 
22 All the reported standard errors are clustered at the county level, making them asymptotically robust 
to both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
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 A quick look at the control variables, focusing on the statistically significant ones, shows 
that the share of foreigners has a positive effect on GDP per capita. This might be as this variable 
is picking up the effect of bigger cities, instead of the urbanization dummies (which are 
statistically insignificant). Areas with higher shares of people with little or only some education 
tend to fare worse economically. Moreover, a higher share of females working full time has a 
positive impact, whereas the opposite is true for a higher male full time working share. The 
industry composition dummies are consistent with the prior beliefs, with somewhat lower GDP 
in areas with a higher share of labour force in the agriculture industry, and the opposite effects 
when a larger share is working in the manufacturing industry. Finally, unemployment has a 
negative effect on the GDP per capita. 
In column (2), unobserved county specific effects are allowed for by using a random 
effects model. Now the effect of installed wind power production capacity has become 
statistically insignificant, and negative. This means that economically-attractive counties are 
also more likely to install wind capacity. Such factors could be unobserved factors like a 
county’s actual quality of the infrastructure, political differences, or the efficiency and structure 
of its administration. Cultural differences like the inhabitants’ working attitude and their general 
attitude toward self-employment could also be captured in these locational factors.23 Hence, the 
existence of such a dependence of GDP per capita on these factors renders the OLS results 
biased. The significant effect found in the OLS regression is due to omitted unobserved county-
specific differences. In the random effects specification, the effects of the controls are even 
more significant, as can be seen in column (2), relative to what is seen in column (1).  
                                                 
23 An additional factor might be the actual ownership-structure of the German wind projects, which is 
unclear, as discussed in the introduction. A positive correlation between unobservable factors and wind 
turbine installations could explain why counties that have rather positive locational factors also install 
more wind power, since they simply have a better cultural, structural and financial setup. Hence, there 
is correlation between the unobserved factors and the installation of wind power and, consequently, the 
change of signs between the linear and the fixed effects estimates. 
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  However, also the random effects results are only unbiased under the assumption that 
the explanatory variables and the unobserved county specific effects are independent. If this is 
not the case, a remedy is the fixed effects model, which allows for such dependencies. When 
testing whether the coefficient vectors of the random effect model and the fixed effect model 
are the same, using the Hausman test, the null hypothesis of no difference is strongly rejected 
(ௗ௙ୀଵଵଶ = 228.04). Thus, there are dependencies between the explanatory variables and the 
unobserved county specific effects. Therefore, the fixed effects estimates are preferred over the 
random effects estimates and the pooled OLS. 
The results of the fixed effects model are reported in column (3). Again there is the 
negative, but statistically insignificant, effect of additional units of installed wind power 
capacity. The difference to the significant and positive OLS estimate might be due to a 
correlation between the mentioned unobserved factors fi and the installation of wind power, as 
described in the above paragraphs. Turning to the other control variables, the elderly share and 
agricultural employment share have lost significance/dropped strongly. This is possibly the case 
because these variables do not vary much over time and thus are picked up by the fixed county-
specific effect fi.  
 
Robustness checks 
When using the fixed effects model (as well as the pooled OLS and the random effect model), 
it is implicitly assumed that the cross-sectional units, the counties, are independent and that 
there is no cross-sectional dependency in the error term. Thus, one implicitly says for instance 
that there are no neighbourhood effects or common preferences across counties. Otherwise, the 
existence of such cross-sectional dependencies would render the FE and RE estimates biased 
and inconsistent. Given that the units in this analysis are counties, with an average population 
of 187,000, it seems reasonable to believe that, for instance, GDP per capita, both level and 
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growth, depends on financial and political integration between the counties, as well as 
characteristics and the performance of neighbouring counties. Such factors create strong 
interdependencies between the counties.24 Two statistical procedures designed to test for cross-
sectional dependence in the error term in panels are utilized (Pesaran, 2004 and Friedman, 1937); 
both implemented in STATA (see De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). The basic idea behind these 
tests is to calculate an overall correlation coefficient based on all the potential parings of the 
residuals of the various cross-sectional units (here, counties). The null hypotheses are that there 
is no cross-sectional dependency. Pesaran’s (p-value = 0.53) and Friedman’s (p-value = 1.00) 
tests fail to reject the null-hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence. Stated differently, 
cross-sectional dependency does not invalidate the estimated results. 
The fixed effect specification can be seen as a way to control for unobserved selection 
effects, if the selection effect is constant over time and is correlated with the unobserved 
characteristics of the analysed counties. In addition, this analysis addresses the potential 
feedback process from the economic development onto the installation of wind power capacity 
by using a fixed effects instrumental variable method. A county’s wind potential is used as a 
possible instrument for the installed wind capacity. The results of this IV estimation are reported 
in Table 2, column (4). The estimates from the fixed effect IV approach do not lead to a change 
in the estimated effect of installed wind capacity; the estimate is nearly identical to that of the 
standard FE-model. Focusing on the relevant IV test statistics, the Kleibergen-Paap test 
indicates that the instrument is highly relevant (i.e., no weak instrument problem). In addition, 
the F-test (= 10.90) used to test the relevance of the instrument in the first stage of the 2SLS 
reaches their “rule of thumb” value of 10. What is more is that the endogeneity test, p-value 
equal to 0.17, yields that endogeneity is not a problem in this case. This is probably because the 
                                                 
24 Differences between the states, for instance regional/state specific policies, are controlled for by the 
state dummies, which in the county fixed effect model are picked up by the county fixed effects. 
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normal fixed effects estimator already allows for unobserved locational factors that influence 
both economic growth and the installation of wind capacity. Hence, endogeneity of the installed 
wind capacity is not an issue.25 But most importantly, just like the regular FE model, the FE-IV 
results show statistically insignificant effects of the installed wind capacity on the economic 
development of German counties.  
Even though all the reported standard errors are clustered at county level and therefore 
robust to potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, testing of the heretofore preferred 
FE model reveals the presence of positive autocorrelation. 26 A probable explanation for this 
autocorrelation is mis-specified dynamics – in particular, the reliance so far on a completely 
static model specification. It is definitely true that wind power installations are long-term 
projects such that each year’s optimization problem is unlikely to be uncorrelated with the ones 
in previous years. This is implemented in a very simple and ad hoc way of dealing with 
dynamics by including a lagged dependent variable. This model can be expressed as    
 
0 1 1ln ln ln ' '         it it it it it t itGDPcap GDPcap InstWindC SocioEcControl EconUrban v  (8) 
 
It is well known that such a dynamic model has to be estimated using an instrumental 
variable technique, so the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM approach is used. The full set of results 
and details about instruments used of this additional model are reported in the appendix.27 The 
                                                 
25 The view that endogeneity is not an issue is supported when looking at the results from a specification 
where one only utilizes the differences between the counties, and not within each group – then 
exogeneity of the installed wind capacity cannot be rejected. 
26 A panel data estimator which allows for first-order auto-correlation in the error term, see Baltagi and 
Wu (1999), is also used. These results show indeed that the autoregressive coefficient in the error term 
is positive (= 0.601). Most importantly, the coefficients of the installed wind power and the other control 
variables are very similar to the fixed effects results already reported in Table 2, column (iii). (These 
results are not reported, but available from the authors on request). 
27 This latter form, eq. (8),  may be written as  
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most important aspect, when looking at the dynamic model results, is that the coefficient, ߚଵ, 
for the wind power instalment is still statistically insignificant. Thus, dynamic mis-specification 
is unlikely to be the explanation for the findings that installation of wind power capacity does 
not have a significant impact on GDP per capita.28    
An interesting question when one analyses the effect of wind power instalments in a 
county is whether the effects are due to the profitability on intensive margin (the effect of an 
additional unit in areas with already existing installations) or to the extensive margin (going 
from zero to something). For this study, 257 out of the 393 counties had some wind power 
installed before sample period. Only 30 counties that did not have wind power before the sample 
period installed wind power during the sample period (7.6% of all counties). Therefore, a major 
portion of new installations were made in counties where previous installations existed, such 
that the results are driven by contributions on the intensive margin. One might think that using 
wind power as an instrument for regional development might be relevant in rural areas with no 
wind power installations. Such zero to something installations may also lead to positive 
externalities, for instance a positive business climate and atmosphere among firms and 
consumers, externalities that might affect the productivity and income in a county. With pre-
existing wind power installations one could think that such externalities are marginal, as this 
analysis finds.  
This section is concluded with a brief comparison to previous findings. The overall 
result in this study is that installed wind power does not affect economic development in 
                                                 
1
0 1 1
ln ln ln
ln ln ' '
it it it
it it it it t it
GDPcap GDPcap GDPcap
GDPcap InstWindC SocioEcControl EconUrban v   


  
       
where  = (-1). This formulation is consistent with the growth model by Barro (1991). The estimated 
ߠ ൌ 	ߛ െ 1 = 0.719-1 = -0.281 states that as GDP per capita increases, growth slows down. 
28 Interestingly, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable ߛ and the auto-regressive coefficient in 
the error term when applying the Baltagi-Wu estimator (see footnote 26) appear to be quite close. This 
might indicate that the dynamic specification could be driven by persistency in the error terms of the 
static model described by equation (7). 
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German counties. In the US, counties where wind power is installed, e.g. the Great Plains and 
Texas, are typically extremely rural. 29  When investments in these areas are made, this 
potentially yields much higher side-effects, like investments in local infrastructure or a shift 
away from agriculture. In Germany, the counties are rather industrialized even without wind 
power investments. Therefore, such investments do not bring any particularly strong side-
effects with them. Furthermore, almost all counties that installed wind power in the sample 
period had already installed capacity beforehand. Moreover, local in-county entrepreneurs in 
Germany might only to a small degree be able to participate in the implementation of the 
projects due to the generally shorter distances between counties. Thus, wind park investors are 
more likely to use out-of-county contractors. Another potential explanation is the ownership 
structure, as a higher share of locally-owned projects might lead to greater local economic 
impacts of these projects. The actual prevalence of local ownership structures is unclear and, 
consequently, its economic implications. Moreover, the results are in line with previous 
findings for the effects of a particular wind power project around the German city of Hannover 
as found by Schröder (2010), and with the findings for Wales by Munday et al. (2011) and 
Bristow et al. (2012), who all find no or only marginal effects.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Wind power deployment in many countries depends on the decisions of local planning 
authorities. These decisions, along with public opinion about wind farms, are shaped by the 
perception of the local economic impacts of such projects. Often it is argued that such wind 
power deployment will be economically beneficial for the area and, among other things, that 
                                                 
29  The difference in results compared to Brown et al. (2012) does not stem from the different 
methodological approach. It remains also when applying an estimator similar to their quasi-cross-
sectional one. 
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such wind power deployment will positively affect regional GDP per capita. Germany is not an 
exception to this conjecture. 
In this study we estimate the local economic impacts of wind power deployment in 
Germany. Importantly, we look at the very county only where the turbines are located. Country-
wide effects of wind power deployment have up to now received considerably more attention 
in the literature. Furthermore, this study addresses the potential endogeneity of wind power 
installations through a panel data setup. Such endogeneity could arise if the decision to install 
wind turbines in a county depends on that county’s economic performance. Through the use of 
panel data for Germany for the period between 2002 and 2009, such effects are controlled for.  
The pooled OLS yields that a (very large) 1 GW wind power project increases a county’s 
GDP per capita by 0.389%. Yet, as this estimate is biased due to omitted county specific effects, 
it is argued that the fixed effects estimate is superior. This estimate, on the other hand, signals 
that the estimates give insignificance-results for the installed wind capacity. Taking into 
account that the installed wind capacity over this period could be endogenous, an instrument is 
created based on the counties’ wind potential. The estimation results affirm the insignificance 
of the installation of wind farms for local economies. 
These findings are interesting in light of a number of studies for American counties 
where wind power deployment is found to have an economically significant impact. Yet, the 
few existing European studies, focused on Wales and the Shetland Islands in the UK as well as 
Hannover in Germany also indicate that there are only limited, if any, local economic impacts 
in these areas. The conceptual framework shows that besides pure local economic incentives 
for counties to install wind power, such installations can also be pushed forward due to other 
aspects of wind power. 
Our findings, both in the theoretical framework and the empirical analysis, along with 
existing European results, indicate that the importance of wind power for local economic 
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development is marginal. These findings lend support to the notion that wind farm consents is 
more complex than mere local economic reasons. National/international bodies decide on 
renewable energy growth targets. Thus, the local economic effect will be hard to observe and 
might not be the only driving force green policies in general, and wind power installations more 
specifically. Whether this conclusion is robust to other regions and other countries remains to 
be seen (and is beyond the scope of this paper). Thus, the growth of wind power deployment 
is, seen from a local perspective, likely to be driven by considerations like the associated 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, country-wide economic impacts and active industry 
policy, rather than by pure local economic considerations. However, German local 
governmental policy-makers, in line with local decision-makers in most other countries, decide 
on whether and where projectors can erect wind turbines, so that their local decision about 
expected outcomes is crucial for wind power projects. A limitation of this study is that local 
decision-makers might very well have expectations that wind projects will increase economic 
welfare in their county, even though these expectations – on average – appear not to hold. As 
we do not have empirical information on counties’ and projects’ decision-making processes, 
further research into these expectations of involved policy-makers would add value to this 
debate. 
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Appendix: About the dynamic model estimation  
 
The lagged dependent variable in the panel data model induces endogeneity issues, and the 
procedure suggested by Arellano-Bond (1991), implemented in STATA (xtabond2, see 
Roodman, 2009), is implemented. That means, first the county specific terms are removed by 
estimating the model in first differences, and the first-difference of the lagged dependent 
variable - the GDP per capita – is instrumented by GDP per capita in levels, lagged t-2 to t-4 in 
a GMM setup. The number of lags is restricted so that the Hansen test statistic is unlikelier to 
get biased due to instrument-proliferation. The results of the Arellano-Bond procedure are 
shown in Table A1. 
 
 [Table A1 about here] 
 
 
The test statistics justify the dynamic specification: As expected, there is no second 
order auto-correlation in differences, so the dynamic specification is trust-worthy and no further 
lagged dependent variables need to be included. The Hansen test, unbiased in case of 
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation, states that all instruments are indeed exogenous on a 5% 
significance level. 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, 0.719, is statistically significant. Most 
importantly, the coefficient of the installed wind capacity is statistically insignificant also in 
this specification.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables for the period 2002-2009 
 
Variable                Mean               Std. dev. Add. description 
GDP per capita* 26511.95 10450.78  
Installed wind capacity** 22503.580 51065.230 cumulative amount in MW 
Wind potential (instrument)*** 1102937 1493907
Population* 18.690 14.344 in 100,000 
Elderly share* 0.196 0.023 <= 65 years 
Foreigner share* 0.073 0.045
Little education share* 0.184 0.047 no job qualification 
Some education share* 0.720 0.066 some job qualification 
Higher education share* 0.096 0.044 higher univ. degree 
Agricultural empl. share* 0.032 0.024
Manuf. empl. share* 0.220 0.086
Male FTEs share* 0.955 0.019 % of men work. full-time 
Female FTEs share* 0.673 0.045 % of women work. f.-time 
Unemployment rate* 0.104 0.050
Urban area**** 0.158 0.365
Mostly urban area**** 0.344 0.475
Mostly rural area**** 0.249 0.433
Rural area**** 0.249 0.433   
Data sources:    
* Regionaldatenbank Deutschland (2013)    
** IWET (2013)    
*** Own calculations based on DWD (2013)   
**** BBSR (2011)    
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Table 2: Empirical Results 
 
 
 
Pooled 
OLS 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects IV 
Dep. var.: ln of GDP/Cap. in €     
COEFFICIENTS         
Installed wind capacity 0.389* -0.063 -0.042 -0.095 
 (0.154) (0.095) (0.096) (0.103) 
Population 0.000 -0.002 -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Elderly share 0.992 0.921** 0.363 0.424 
 (0.603) (0.322) (0.385) (0.433) 
Foreigner share 1.072* 2.631*** 1.548* 1.609* 
 (0.479) (0.421) (0.605) (0.628) 
Little education share 0.244 -0.362 -0.090 -0.118 
 (0.542) (0.320) (0.388) (0.392) 
Some education share -1.183** -0.276 0.039 0.021 
 (0.395) (0.285) (0.346) (0.346) 
Agricultural empl. share -4.622*** -2.411*** -0.559 -0.574 
 (0.656) (0.625) (0.697) (0.702) 
Manuf. empl. share 1.007*** 0.415** 0.457* 0.476* 
 (0.199) (0.161) (0.212) (0.208) 
Male FTEs share -4.675*** 0.015 0.307 0.296 
 (0.959) (0.336) (0.326) (0.331) 
Female FTEs share 1.527*** 0.435* 0.332 0.331 
 (0.428) (0.203) (0.216) (0.214) 
Unemployment share -0.433 -0.598*** -0.685*** -0.687*** 
 (0.346) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) 
Mostly urban area -0.092* -0.244*** .  
 (0.042) (0.047) .  
Mostly rural area -0.025 -0.228*** .  
 (0.046) (0.054) .  
Rural area 0.028 -0.212*** .  
 (0.050) (0.057) .  
TESTS         
Joint significance tests	௔     
      State dummies 5.03*** 62.17   
      Year dummies 55.53*** 621.84*** 91.15*** 572.35*** 
Endogeneity test	௕    0.17***  
1SLS Joint Sign.F test    10.90*** 
Instrument relevance test	௖    40.06*** 
N 
            
3144  3144 
                   
3144  3144 
30 
  
Standard errors in parentheses     
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
     
Note: Explanatory variables measured in every year between 2002 and 2009, except for the county type 
variables that are measured in 2010. Year and state dummies and a constant term are also included, but 
are not reported individually here. Schleswig-Holstein, the year 2002, urban areas and the share of the 
population with a high education served as baseline scenario.  
	ܽ The significance tests are a ߯ଶ-test for the random effects model and F-tests for the others.  
	ܾ The difference of two Sargan-Hansen tests is taken. A significant difference indicates exogeneity of 
the instrument. 
	௖ Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic: H0: System is underidentified as the instruments are only weakly correlated 
with the instrumented variable. 
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Figure 1: Installed onshore wind capacity in Germany in 2011 
 
 
Source: Based on Fraunhofer Windenergie & Energiesystemtechnik (IWES), 2012, based on 
data from Ingenieurwerkstatt Energietechnik (IWET) 
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Figure 2: Wind Energy Potential in Germany 
 
 
German wind energy potential 80m above ground; Black: wind return < 60% of reference value; 
Grey: between 60% and 100%; White: >100%. Source: Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD) (2013) 
and Geodatenzentrum (2009) 
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Table A1: Dynamic model estimation results 
  
Dep. var.: ln of GDP/Cap. In €  
COEFFICIENTS   
ln of GDP/Cap lagged 0.719** 
 (0.241) 
Installed wind capacity 0.089 
 (0.081) 
Population -0.005 
 (0.004) 
Elderly share 0.086 
 (0.287) 
Foreigner share 1.073 
 (0.587) 
Little education share 0.223 
 (0.374) 
Some education share 0.287 
 (0.284) 
Agricultural empl. share -0.312 
 (0.670) 
Manuf. empl. share 0.113 
 (0.164) 
Male FTEs share -0.405 
 (0.274) 
Female FTEs share 0.261 
 (0.196) 
Unemployment share -0.437** 
 (0.135) 
TESTS   
m1	௔ 
m2	௔ 
0.000 
0.387 
Hansen test of overidentification	௕ 
Number of instruments 
39.53 
32 
N 2358 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Note: GMM results are one-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and test 
statistics. 
	௔ A test of first-order and second-order serial correlation in first differences; asymptotically N(0,1). 
	௕  The minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation 
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Figure A1: Degree of urbanization in Germany  
 
Source: Based on Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR), 2011 
Category Description
Large City City with more than 100,000 inhabitants 
Urban area At least 50% of population live in cities, population density above 150 people/km² 
Intermediate
At least 50% of population live in cities + population density 
below 150 people/km² or population density above 150 
people/km² 
Very rural All other counties 
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